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n recent years, globalization has 
forced a deeper appreciation of the 
relationship between intellectual 
property (IP) law and global health. 
The threat of an emergent avian bird 
ﬂ  u pandemic led to calls for Roche to 
relax patent restrictions on oseltamivir, 
a drug with potential efﬁ  cacy against 
bird inﬂ  uenza [1,2]. In the context 
of the fall 2001 anthrax attacks, the 
US government faced pressure to 
break Bayer’s patent on ciproﬂ  oxacin 
in order to increase availability of 
the drug [3]. Such situations have 
generated intense debate over the 
value of patent protection amidst 
health crises.
    Nowhere have these debates been 
more intense than around the issue 
of global access to HIV treatment. 
Multinational pharmaceutical 
companies, World Trade Organization 
(WTO) members, US and European 
Union trade representatives, and 
health-care activists have clashed over 
provision of antiretroviral therapy 
(ART) to people living with AIDS in 
developing countries. The debate 
centers upon the value and role of 
patents obtained for HIV-related 
pharmaceutical products, drug-
manufacturing techniques, and forms 
of drug delivery. These arguments 
have recently intensiﬁ  ed amidst an 
increased US pursuit of bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral trade 
agreements—which include strong 
IP provisions—with low- and middle-
income countries throughout the 
world. 
    In this paper, we examine the key 
areas of concern regarding access 
to ART related to US-negotiated 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral 
trade agreements. We ﬁ  rst examine 
developments in IP law in the wake 
of WTO’s Doha Declaration, which 
afﬁ  rmed the priority of public health 
over the protection of patents. We 
look speciﬁ  cally at those developments 
with particular salience for health-
related issues and link this history 
with the current context of access to 
antiretrovirals (ARVs) worldwide. Next 
we map out the key claims about, and 
questions surrounding, the role of 
patent law, followed by a critical look 
at the impact of trade agreements on 
IP law and their potential threat to 
global health. Finally, we suggest policy 
and advocacy strategies to ensure and 
promote access to ART in the era of 
US-led attempts to strengthen global IP 
law through the vehicle of “free” trade 
agreements.
    IP Law as It Relates to Public 
Health: Doha and Beyond
    The Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement, completed in 1994, 
revolutionized global patent law by 
requiring the standardization of IP law 
among all WTO members by January 1, 
2005. Immediately, concern arose that 
the TRIPS agreement would constrain 
the protection of public health in 
low- and middle-income countries. In 
response, WTO delegates gathered in 
Doha, Qatar, on November 14, 2001, 
issued a strong statement, now referred 
to as the Doha Declaration [4]. 
Delegates agreed at Doha that the least-
developed country members (deﬁ  ned 
as such by the United Nations based on 
a series of indicators including income, 
nutrition, health, education, literacy, 
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  Box 1. Trade Liberalization 
around the World
    •  US Bilateral Trade Agreements: 
Agreements negotiated between the 
US and one other country. Examples 
include the US–Chile Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA), the US–Peru FTA, 
the US–Colombia FTA, and the US–
Australia FTA.
    •  US Regional Trade Agreements: 
Agreements negotiated between 
the US and a number of neighboring 
countries. Examples include the North 
American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the US–CAFTA, and the 
US–South African Customs Union Free 
Trade Negotiations.
  •  Multilateral  Trade  Agreements: 
Agreements negotiated at a global 
level. The TRIPS agreement is an 
example.  PLoS Medicine  |  www.plosmedicine.org 1231
and economic vulnerability [5]) were 
not obliged to implement patent law 
for pharmaceuticals until January 
1, 2016. Of the 50 least-developed 
countries, 32 are WTO members. 
    Additionally, the Doha Declaration 
acknowledged the short-sightedness of 
the TRIPS agreement rule mandating 
that countries could break patents 
only in public health emergencies 
in order to produce generic drugs 
“predominantly for the supply of the 
domestic market”[6]. This wording left 
countries without domestic production 
capacity unable to access generic 
medications for their populations. In 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, 
WTO ofﬁ  cials ordered the TRIPS 
council to develop a plan to address 
this problem by the end of 2002: “We 
recognize that WTO members with 
insufﬁ  cient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical 
sector could face difﬁ  culties in making 
effective use of compulsory licensing 
[the granting of a license to another 
producer to manufacture, use, and 
distribute generic versions of patented 
inventions without the consent of the 
patent holder but in exchange for a 
remuneration to compensate for the 
reduction of the potential market for 
the branded sale of the drugs] under 
the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct 
the Council for TRIPS to ﬁ  nd an 
expeditious solution to this problem 
and to report to the General Council 
before the end of 2002” [4].
    Reaching consensus on what 
became known as the “paragraph 6 
problem” created great debate among 
TRIPS council members. The US led 
an effort to restrict the provisions of 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration 
to certain diseases: namely, AIDS, 
malaria, tuberculosis, and other 
infectious diseases creating epidemics. 
In addition to trying to limit the use 
of compulsory licenses, the US worked 
to limit the number of countries that 
could beneﬁ  t from the importation of 
generic medications [7]. On August 30, 
2003, the TRIPS council ﬁ  nally issued 
the “Decision on Implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration,” 
stating that countries without 
manufacturing capacities—a deﬁ  nition 
that still remains unclear—could 
declare compulsory licenses and on 
that basis alone legally import generic 
medications. However, this decision 
was only a temporary waiver until a 
permanent amendment could be 
agreed upon.
    Efforts to agree upon a permanent 
amendment to TRIPS were fraught 
with further discord. The US and 
other developed countries argued for 
ratiﬁ  cation of the temporary waiver 
as a permanent amendment. On the 
other hand, developing countries, led 
by the African Group, argued that the 
temporary waiver included too many 
procedural obstacles that would still 
hinder access to essential medications 
for countries without domestic 
production capacity [8]. Médecins 
Sans Frontières pointed out that no 
country had actually used the temporary 
amendment and argued that it would be 
unwise to make permanent something 
that had not been tested [9].
    Despite these concerns, WTO 
members agreed in early December 
2005, just prior to the WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Hong Kong, to make 
the temporary waiver permanent if 
at least two-thirds of the 148 WTO 
members ratiﬁ  ed the amendment by 
December 1, 2007 [10]. The US and 
the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) 
touted the amendment as “part of 
the wider national and international 
action, including many activities taken 
by PhRMA companies, to address the 
gravity of the public health problems 
afﬂ  icting many developing and least-
developed countries” [11]. Yet do these 
acts of apparent generosity translate 
into tangible advances in access to 
essential medicines in low- and middle-
income countries?
    Have WTO Rules Improved Access 
to ART?
    For all the wrangling over the speciﬁ  c 
provisions of the TRIPS agreement 
and the self-proclaimed interest 
by multinational pharmaceutical 
companies and the US government 
in promoting global health, we argue 
that little has changed to suggest that 
WTO rules improve global public 
health. In fact, compulsory licenses, 
the primary mechanism offered for 
public health protection by the TRIPS 
agreement and the Doha Declaration, 
have rarely been used [12]. The exact 
procedures for issuing a compulsory 
license for ARV production remain 
unclear and largely untested. 
Signiﬁ  cant international pressure also 
exists against declaring compulsory 
licenses—as seen when Brazil recently 
threatened to issue compulsory licenses 
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pmed.0030332.g001 
  Figure 1.   Annual Treatment Cost of Stavudine 40 mg + Lamivudine 150 mg + Nevirapine 
200 mg per Patient in Countries Receiving PEPFAR Funding for which Cost Information Is 
Available 
      Source: Global Price Reporting Mechanism, http://www.who.int/3by5/amds/price/hdd/index.aspx
    Note: These calculations have been made with the most recent cost published. Drug manufacturers 
include Cipla (FDC), Bristol-Myers Squibb (stavudine), GlaxoSmithKline (lamivudine), and 
Boehringer Ingelheim (nevirapine). In all these countries, the annual cost of branded stavudine is 
US$55 and that of branded lamivudine is US$70; nevirapine accounts for the rest of the cost. 
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for efavirenz, lopinavir/ritonavir, and 
tenofovir [13,14]. For these reasons in 
part, only four countries—Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Zambia, and Mozambique—
have thus far issued compulsory 
licenses for ARV production, all of 
them in 2004 [15].
    No country has yet made use of the 
provisions instilled in the temporary 
waiver, even though many low- and 
middle-income countries face public 
health emergencies. Southern Africa, 
for example, is currently witnessing a 
decimation of its population by AIDS, 
while malaria kills at least 1 million 
people, predominantly children, per 
year. So why aren’t these countries 
using the waiver provisions? Some 
might suggest the old mantra that 
low- and middle-income governments 
are too corrupt and power-seeking 
to actually care about the health of 
their populations. But if this were 
true, how could we explain the health 
successes of countries such as Brazil, 
Cuba, and Thailand? An alternative 
explanation, as suggested by the 
African Group, is that WTO rules are 
far too cumbersome and impractical 
for poor countries to navigate. Viewed 
in this light, the humanitarian motives 
pled by pharmaceutical companies and 
economically powerful governments 
can be seen as empty lip service, 
functioning only to counter growing 
calls for social justice in global health. 
    Pharmaceutical companies also 
argue that patents are central to the 
preservation of innovation. Yet there 
is little evidence that current IP law 
creates incentives for the development 
of new drugs. An analysis of a small 
sample of pharmaceutical inventive 
activity before and after compulsory 
licensing showed no uniform decline in 
scientiﬁ  c innovation [16], challenging 
the assumption that patent protection 
is necessary to foster the development 
of new drugs. Furthermore, current 
patent protections do not necessarily 
create ﬁ  nancial incentives for the 
development of desperately needed 
drugs, such as a malaria vaccine, 
in poor countries: between 1975 
and 1997, only 13 out of 1,223 new 
drugs introduced globally were 
speciﬁ  cally targeted toward diseases 
disproportionately affecting poor 
countries [17].
    In support of the research-based 
pharmaceutical companies that 
produce brand-name drugs, some 
argue that patent laws have historically 
played very little role in inhibiting 
access to essential medicines in the 
developing world, asserting instead that 
poverty and poor health infrastructure 
are the primary obstacles to ARV 
distribution [18,19]. Additionally, poor 
drug quality, inadequate public health 
infrastructure, understaffed clinics and 
hospitals, lack of political commitment, 
and underﬁ  nancing of HIV treatment 
programs are cited as major factors 
obstructing the provision of ART. 
While recognizing the ability of these 
factors to impede access to ARVs, 
and working for their elimination, 
health activists counter that patent 
law—because of its role in determining 
drug prices—also creates a formidable 
barrier to access to medicines.
    Health activists and academics 
argue that current patent protection, 
by eliminating competition, generally 
leads to higher prices [20,21], which 
directly obstructs the promotion 
of global health equity. Due to the 
enormity of the AIDS pandemic, 
health activism has recently focused 
upon HIV treatment, charging that 
current IP law impedes the purchase 
of ARVs in resource-poor settings and 
allows pharmaceutical companies to 
monopolize the markets of developing 
nations [22–25]. As a result, the cost 
of ARVs far exceeds personal and 
national budgets, and the development 
of more affordable generic alternatives 
is proscribed. This cost not only 
represents an insurmountable barrier 
to initiating treatment but also could 
hamper complete adherence and 
trigger drug resistance for those already 
on therapy [26]. From the vantage 
point of health activists, alternatives 
to current patent law and incentive 
mechanisms, such as regulatory 
ﬂ  exibility (which could allow the 
mix of local production and imports 
of generic drugs) [21,27] or “pull” 
programs to stimulate research for 
vaccine development [28], are crucial 
to alleviate the suffering of people 
living with treatable diseases in poor 
countries.
    Access to ARVs and Patent Law
    Increasing ART distribution is a 
public health imperative. Currently, 
40.3 million people in the world live 
with HIV. In 2005, 3.1 million people 
in the world died of AIDS; of these, 
about 570,000 were children [29]. HIV 
medications dramatically decrease HIV 
mortality and morbidity, and, when 
ARVs are made available, HIV treatment 
in resource-poor settings has been 
shown to be extremely successful [30].
    Between December 2003 and 
2005, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) led an effort, called the “3 by 
5” initiative, to rapidly scale up HIV 
treatment worldwide, aiming to treat 3 
million people with ART by the end of 
2005. During the initiative, the number 
of patients receiving ART in low- and 
middle-income countries increased 
from 400,000 to 1.3 million [31]. 
Although short of the December 2005 
goal, the initiative achieved signiﬁ  cant 
progress in mobilizing the expansion 
of ART. WHO estimates that between 
250,000 and 350,000 premature deaths 
were averted due to the scale-up in 
ART. Despite these successes, many 
challenges remain in improving access 
to ART. Some of the reasons cited by 
WHO to explain the failure to reach 
the 3 by 5 initiative’s targets include 
poorly harmonized partnerships; 
constraints on the procurement and 
  Box 2. Timeline of Key Events 
Related to Pharmaceutical IP 
Law
    1883: Paris Convention establishes 20-
year patent protection.
    1986–1994: Uruguay round of trade 
negotiations occurs, during which the 
TRIPS agreement is formulated.
    1995: The WTO is established, and the 
TRIPS agreement is implemented. 
    1999: Large-scale protests against 
globalization occur during the WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Seattle.
    2001 November: Doha Declaration is 
made in Qatar.
    2003 August: Temporary waiver is 
established to address the “paragraph 6 
problem.”
    2004 May: US and Central American 
countries sign CAFTA with TRIPS-plus 
measures.
    2005 March: India passes amendments to 
become TRIPS-compliant.
    2005 December: US completes trade 
agreement with Peru with TRIPS-plus 
measures.
    2006 February: US completes trade 
agreement with Columbia with TRIPS-
plus measures. 
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supply of drugs, diagnostics, and 
other commodities; strained human 
resources capacity and other critical 
weaknesses in health systems; and 
difﬁ  culties in ensuring equitable access 
[31].
    In addition to these challenges, 
global changes in IP law threaten 
to slow down or even reverse gains 
made in improving access to ART. 
Most types of ARVs, of which 12 are 
included in the WHO list of essential 
medicines [32], are produced by 
generic manufacturers in India [33], 
where it is estimated that 5.1 million 
adults and children are living with HIV 
[34]. Indian generic companies such 
as Cipla and Ranbaxy, capitalizing on 
the country’s substantial economic and 
infrastructural capabilities for drug 
production, have become the major 
suppliers of low-cost ART regimens 
throughout the developing world [35]. 
Médecins Sans Frontières estimates 
that 50 percent of these medications 
are produced in India [36]. However, 
this supply of inexpensive generic 
ARVs may soon end as a result of 
India’s obligation to enforce patent 
protection for medicines since 
January 1, 2005, in accordance with 
stipulations laid out in the 1996 TRIPS 
agreement—changes that have caused 
great concern among those working to 
expand HIV treatment. Believing that 
strengthened patent law would increase 
opportunities for foreign investment 
within India, the Indian government 
passed amendments in March 2005 
that boosted IP law and could hinder 
the future production of medications 
for health emergencies such as AIDS 
[37–39]. 
    These developments have generated 
worldwide concern that access to 
affordable ART, especially for second- 
and third-line ARVs, may be severely 
constrained under India’s enforcement 
of TRIPS. In a December 17, 2004, 
letter to the Indian Minister of Health, 
Jim Y. Kim, then director of the 
Department of HIV/AIDS at the WHO 
cautioned India against implementing 
new patent law that would hinder 
public health efforts both within and 
outside of India [40]. Indian health 
ctivists declared that “the Government 
is adopting a simplistic, conformist 
approach of hurriedly ‘aligning’ our 
Patent Law to the coercive version of 
TRIPS” and asserted that “the need of 
the hour is to follow a more creative 
and independent approach, while still 
remaining within the broad contours 
of TRIPS” [41]. Many worry that the 
patent law changes in India will end the 
Indian supply of cheap, generic ART, 
thereby resulting in higher medication 
prices and the imposition of permanent 
obstacles that may unnecessarily thwart 
efforts to deliver ART to the poor. 
This issue of access to medicines is at 
the heart of the current and historical 
controversy over the role of IP law. The 
issue forces us to confront the question 
of whether proﬁ  t or human health 
should take priority. 
  US Trade Policy and Access to ARVs
    In January 2003, President Bush 
announced his ﬁ  ve-year plan that 
would allocate $15 billion to global 
programs aimed at HIV treatment 
and prevention, now referred to as 
the President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) [42]. Working 
in 15 focus countries, this initiative 
endeavors to support treatment for 2 
million people living with HIV/AIDS, 
to prevent 7 million new infections, and 
to support care for 10 million people 
infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS 
by 2008. 
    After just eight months of operation, 
PEPFAR reported rapid progress in 
achieving its aims—by March 2005, 
155,000 people were receiving ART, 
1.2 million women and infants had 
beneﬁ  ted from measures to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission of HIV, 
and 1.7 million individuals infected 
with or affected by HIV/AIDS were 
receiving supportive care under its 
auspices [43]. Moreover, at the 2005 
Summit of the Group of Eight Nations 
(G8), the heads of state of the eight 
wealthiest countries pledged additional 
aid with a focus on AIDS in Africa, and 
surmised that universal access to HIV 
treatment could be possible by 2010 
[44].
    However, recent US trade policy 
threatens to undermine these advances 
in improving access to ARVs. After 
failing to promote “free” trade on 
hemispheric and global levels, the 
US has embarked on an aggressive 
campaign to liberalize trade through 
bilateral, regional, and multilateral 
trade agreements (Box 1). These 
agreements have conditioned 
liberalized trade upon the expansion of 
IP law for multinational pharmaceutical 
companies holding patents for ARVs, 
among other essential medicines. 
Speciﬁ  cally, these agreements extend 
the protection of patents beyond the 
20-year period (Box 2), freeze generic 
manufacturing of ARVs, protect the 
manufacturers’ drug testing data 
for ﬁ  ve years (a practice known as 
data exclusivity), and limit options 
for compulsory licensing. Additional 
measures include a reduction in 
the number of inventions, such as 
“diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical 
methods,” that can be excluded from 
patent law, the allowance of known 
substances to be patented again for 
each new use, and provisions requiring 
national drug regulatory authorities 
to block registration of generic 
medications. Such broadened IP rules 
beyond those negotiated in the WTO 
TRIPS agreement are now referred to 
as “TRIPS-plus” measures [45].
    “TRIPS-plus” measures are included 
in agreements recently signed and in 
others currently being negotiated. For 
example, in May 2004, the US signed 
the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA) with Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua (the Dominican Republic 
was added in August 2004). CAFTA 
requires both data exclusivity for ﬁ  ve 
years and patent extensions to offset 
delays in the granting of a patent 
[46]. Additionally, the US has signed 
similar bilateral trade agreements with 
Singapore, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and 
Morocco, and is currently working on 
  Box 3. Crucial Questions about 
IP Law, Trade Agreements, and 
Public Health
    •  Should matters of health constitute a 
state of exception from patent law? 
  •  What  potential  beneﬁ  ts do bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral trade 
agreements have for resource-poor 
settings? 
    •  Do current trade agreements respect 
the national patent law of sovereign 
states and allow these nations to 
prioritize public health? 
    •  Will trade agreements stymie efforts to 
combat global disease, especially the 
AIDS pandemic? 
    •  Can the IP components of trade 
agreements be designed in a manner 
that is mutually beneﬁ  cial for patients 
and for drug innovation? 
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bilateral agreements with Panama and 
Thailand and a regional agreement 
with the Southern African Custom 
Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, 
South Africa, and Swaziland). 
    Health activists, academics, 
developing country governments 
and clinicians working in resource-
poor settings are concerned that 
these agreements will greatly 
augment the power of research-
based pharmaceutical companies 
that produce brand-name drugs in 
the markets of developing nations, 
thereby greatly compromising access 
to ARVs. The extension of patent law 
beyond the provisions delineated in the 
TRIPS agreement is worrying. Trade 
agreements currently being negotiated 
may severely constrain production 
of generic drugs, the primary 
source of affordable medications in 
resource-poor settings. TRIPS-plus 
provisions continue a tradition of 
limiting access to ART for the poor 
by instituting measures that condone 
high drug prices. As a reaction to 
these limitations, in May 2006 ten 
South American countries issued a 
joint declaration on IP committing 
themselves “to avoid TRIPS plus 
provisions in bilateral and regional 
trade agreements,” among other similar 
measures [47].
    In addition to the uneasiness 
expressed by activists, clinicians, and 
researchers, similar concerns have 
recently been voiced from within the 
US government. On September 30, 
2004, 12 members of the US House of 
Representatives submitted a letter to 
President Bush expressing opposition to 
the IP provisions in CAFTA and other 
“free” trade agreement negotiations 
with the Andean countries and Panama. 
Authors of the letter criticized the 
lack of speciﬁ  c language on the right 
to compulsory licensing and parallel 
importation and the imposition of ﬁ  ve-
year blockades on drug testing data. 
They warned that these agreements 
could violate the TRIPS agreement and 
the Doha Declaration [48].
    Further, TRIPS-plus measures 
may have harmful consequences 
for PEPFAR, a program ostensibly 
predicated on a vision for improved 
global health. Professing a desire to 
ensure that the poor receive the best 
HIV treatment medications possible, 
PEPFAR uses a stringent system for 
determining which drugs may be used 
in their treatment program. Originally, 
only brand-name ARVs were used in the 
start-up phases of PEPFAR. However, 
criticism about the exorbitant costs 
associated with brand-name drugs 
forced PEPFAR to consider using 
cheaper generic medications, thereby 
allowing for increased HIV treatment. 
Generic ARVs—such as lamivudine, 
zidovudine, and nevirapine—produced 
by companies in South Africa and India 
received FDA approval in 2005 with 
the hope that this would allow greater 
numbers of patients to be treated 
[49–51]. However, strengthened IP 
provisions, such as TRIPS-plus measures, 
threaten to prevent future production 
of low-cost, generic ARV alternatives for 
use in PEPFAR. The pursuit of TRIPS-
plus measures stands counter to the lofty 
aims to address global health through 
initiatives such as PEPFAR (Figure 1).
  Conclusion:  Prioritizing  Health 
in Patent Law and “Free” Trade 
Agreements
    When it comes to IP law, international 
trade agreements, and access to ART, 
the world’s poor deserve urgent, 
honest answers to a number of crucial 
questions (Box 3). At a time when 
powerful countries use their ﬁ  nancial 
leverage to negotiate trade agreements 
that expand their markets—dictating a 
new global economic order that has far-
reaching public health implications—
the promotion of global health rests 
upon a thorough consideration of 
these questions. Although poverty, 
inadequate public health infrastructure, 
lack of political commitment, and 
poor drug quality certainly contribute 
to inadequate HIV treatment and 
are issues with which to contend, 
international patent law is another 
structural factor with dire implications 
for ART in resource-poor settings. 
    With both the intensiﬁ  cation of 
trade negotiations and concern about 
the impact of trade liberalization 
on developing countries, it is vital 
to formulate alternative strategies 
that promise to mitigate the impact 
of strengthened IP law upon poor 
patients. One such example is the 
Technological Network on HIV/AIDS, 
a consortium including Brazil, Cuba, 
China, Nigeria, Russia, Thailand, and 
Ukraine, and potentially Uruguay, 
India, and South Africa, that aims to 
achieve self-sufﬁ  ciency in the research, 
development, production, and 
distribution of ARVs and other related 
medications [52,53]. In addition, these 
countries aim to critically engage IP law 
in order to ensure that patents do not 
prevent appropriate care of the sick. 
Brazil has led these efforts by reforming 
its laws to be able to break patents and 
by repeatedly threatening to break 
patents in order to continue providing 
free ART for all HIV-positive Brazilians; 
such threats resulted in dramatic ART 
price reductions from brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies [54]. Brazil 
continues to encourage the disavowal 
of patents that hinder the provision of 
health care in low- and middle-income 
countries [14]. Such courageous 
efforts must be publicly and ﬁ  nancially 
supported. 
    Through interdisciplinary efforts, 
the strengthening of IP law can be 
effectively challenged in the interests 
of promoting global health equity. 
Ultimately, increased research 
and advocacy must aim to effect 
concrete changes in the ways that IP 
provisions are integrated into trade 
agreements. Such changes require 
that governments and pharmaceutical 
companies are held responsible for 
their self-proclaimed commitments to 
the common good. There are many 
avenues for promoting these goals. 
WHO should have a stronger position 
in bilateral, regional, and multilateral 
trade negotiations to ensure that public 
health remains a priority. In addition, 
WTO could create a working group 
on health, as has been suggested 
[55], whose recommendations would 
be based on WHO guidelines and 
recommendations. Low- and middle-
income countries could simultaneously 
agree to restrict IP law discussions to 
WTO forums, thereby preventing the 
strong-arming of smaller governments 
in bilateral, regional, and multilateral 
trade negotiations. By supporting each 
other and working within the WTO, 
smaller countries will occupy a stronger 
negotiating position in making public 
health demands. Finally, partnerships 
such as the Global Alliance for TB 
Drug Development should be more 
actively supported to allow for the 
development of drugs that are free 
of patent restrictions and address the 
diseases of the poor.   
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